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Introduction
In 2003, the Sunday Styles section of The New York Times pub-
lished a striking advertisement featuring a smiling baby and a bold
headline asking "Do You Want to Choose the Gender of Your Next
Baby?"1 Readers were directed by this advertisement to a fertility
clinic willing and able to fulfill a would-be parent's desire to choose
her baby's sex. This and similar clinics offer would-be parents the
chance to choose a child free from inherited disease or defect. 2 They
provide assistance to potential parents who themselves lack viable ova
or sperm, and some will facilitate large cash transfers that enable the
infertile to buy ova and sperm from a desirable "donor."' 3 In attempt-
ing to fulfill their clients' desires, many fertility clinics implant pre-
embryos in numbers that elevate the risk of a multiple birth4 or em-
ploy untested procedures that may enhance the risk of birth defects. 5
Some clinics offer such services postmenopause and even post-
mortem. 6 It is with good reason that their highly profitable business
has been termed the "Wild West" of American medicine.7
Most other technologically advanced nations have taken a much
more active regulatory stance toward assisted reproductive technology
("ART"). The United Kingdom has the most comprehensive regula-
tory scheme; the pioneering Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act
of 19908 ("Act") was drafted
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for this Article was supported by
Brooklyn Law School's Faculty Research Fund.
1 See Marcy Darnovsky, Sex Selection Goes Mainstream, ALTERNET, Sept. 25, 2003,
http://www.alternet.org/story/16837. More blatantly, advertisements aimed at Asian immigrants
have asked readers, "Desire a Son?" See Susan Sachs, Clinics' Pitch to Indian tlmigres: It's a
Boy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at Al (describing advertisements in India Abroad).
2 See Darnovsky, supra note 1.
3 See infra notes 148, 153, 156-58 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text.
6 Karen Wright, Human in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, DISCOVER, May 1998, at
74, 76.
7 Id.; see also Gina Kolata, Fertility Inc.: Clinics Race to Lure Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
2002, at F1 (describing marketing and advertising in the infertility business).
8 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.).
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to ensure that . . . sensitive issues of moral and legal com-
plexity are dealt with in a clear framework .... to balance
what are the sometimes conflicting interests of the involunta-
rily childless and the children of the reproduction resolu-
tion . . . . [and] to mediate between the families who may
benefit from research into the causes of genetically inherited
disease ... and the human embryo or foetus.9
The Act sets out a comprehensive regulatory framework that governs
artificial insemination, in vitro fertilization ("IVF"), surrogacy, and re-
search involving pre-embryos; it also establishes a governmental
agency to license ART providers and to resolve issues not dealt with
in the statute.' 0 As a result of this comprehensive regulatory scheme,
in the U.K., it is public policy, not market forces, that determines
whether sex selection is offered to would-be parents and how a host of
other reproductive technology questions should be resolved.
Although few nations as yet have regulation as comprehensive as
that of the U.K., many have legislative or regulatory standards gov-
erning some aspects of ART practice, and most have at least estab-
lished national commissions to formulate such standards.1 As a result
of these regulatory initiatives, many nations, such as member states of
the Council of Europe, 2 forbid sex selection except to avoid serious
genetic illness.13 Some ban the sale of reproductive material, 14 or re-
strict the number of pre-embryos that may be implanted, 15 or disallow
9 DEREK MORGAN & ROBERT G. LEE, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN FERTILISA-
TION & EMBRYOLOGY AT 1990, at 26 (1990).
10 See id. at 27.
11 See International Federation of Fertility Societies Surveillance 07, 87 FERTILITY & STE-
RILITY S8, S9-12 tbls.2.1, 2.2 (2007) [hereinafter IFFS Report] (showing countries with statutes
governing ART practice and those with a licensing body).
12 Coe.int, Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?
NT=164&CM=1&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited July 15, 2008).
13 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being
with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and
Biomedicine art. 14 (1997), Europ. T.S. No. 164, available at http://conventions.coe.intfTreaty/en/
Treaties/Htmli/164.htm [hereinafter Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine] (showing
ratifications).
14 Both Canada and France ban all payment in connection with ova donation. See As-
sisted Human Reproduction Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 2, § 7 (Can.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/
en/ShowFullDoccs/A-13.4///en; Jacques Lansac, French Law Concerning Medically Assisted Re-
production, 11 HUM. REPROD. 1843, 1845 (1996). The U.K. permits modest expense reimburse-
ment. See Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, CH(97)01: Payments for Donors (Apr.
1997), http://www.hfea.gov.uk/en/524.html [hereinafter Payments for Donors].
15 See IFFS Report, supra note 11, at S20 tbl.5.1.
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the use of reproductive technology postmenopause 16 or post-
mortem'7T-or all of these options.
Can-should-the United States abandon its laissez-faire, mar-
ket-based approach to reproductive technology in favor of a regula-
tory model? In this Article, I conclude that some ART regulation is
both constitutionally permissible and desirable. Part I analyzes the
constitutionality of ART regulation. This Part also develops an "in-
terpretive" regulatory strategy that relies on related areas of law for
policy guidance. Part II relies on this approach to develop regulatory
standards and an organizational model to govern medical choices
made by patients using ART. Part III, again relying on the interpre-
tive approach, develops regulatory standards to govern the transfer of
sperm and ova used in ART.
L Is ART Regulation Permissible? Is It Desirable?
A. The Constitutionality of ART Regulation
Some commentators have argued that the United States Consti-
tution precludes most reproductive technology regulation. The best
known is Professor John Robertson, who has argued that
if bearing, begetting, or parenting children is protected as
part of personal privacy or liberty, those experiences should
be protected whether they are achieved coitally or
noncoitally. In either case they satisfy the basic biologic, so-
cial, and psychological drive to have a biologically related
family.
... [Thus o]nly substantial harm to tangible interests of
others should ... justify restriction [on use of reproductive
technologies]. 18
Extrapolating from this basic claim, Robertson contends that "[i]f the
couple lacks the gametes or gestational capacity to produce offspring,
a commitment to procreative liberty should ... permit them the free-
dom to enlist the assistance of willing donors and surrogates" and to
"rel[y] on preconception agreements." 19 In Robertson's view, procre-
16 See AM Archive, IVF Outrage in France, http://www.abc.net.au/am/stories/s317128.htm
(last visited Sept. 26, 2008) (transcribing a June 22, 2001, ABC Local Radio broadcast in
Australia).
17 See IFFS Report, supra note 11, at S27 tbl.7.1.
18 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 39, 41 (1994) [hereinafter CHILDREN OF CHOICE].
19 Id. at 126.
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ative liberty extends to prebirth sex selection, 20 trait determination, 21
and even, in some cases, cloning. 22
I have analyzed Professor Robertson's argument in more detail
elsewhere and have concluded that federal courts are highly unlikely
to adopt his expansive interpretation of the procreative-liberty case
law.2 3 First, the Supreme Court has never required a showing of "sub-
stantial harm to tangible interests" in order to justify state regulation
of reproduction. "Indeed, in recent years, the Court has retreated
from the position that 'compelling' interests are required to justify
governmental restrictions on procreational choice, holding that state
abortion limitations are valid unless they impose an 'undue burden'
on a woman's right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. '24 Although
a complete ban on access to reproductive technology would be consti-
tutionally suspect as it would deny the infertile their only chance at
genetic parentage, there is no obvious reason why a regulatory scheme
like the U.K.'s would not pass constitutional muster under the "undue
burden" standard:2 5
Our tradition of deference to individual decisions about
coital procreation and parenting undeniably supports
equivalent deference to individual choice in the use of tech-
nological conception. But deference does not imply abdica-
tion of any regulatory role. Indeed, parents who want to
adopt, the "traditional" method of achieving parenthood
noncoitally, face a maze of state regulations, including rules
imposing waiting periods before an adoption is finalized,
20 See John A. Robertson, Preconception Gender Selection, 1 AM. J. BIOETHICS 2, 6-7
(2001).
21 See John A. Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV.
421, 427-28, 479 (1996) (arguing that trait selection should be protected unless such selection
"would cause compelling, tangible harm to others" and that government will only rarely be able
to meet this burden).
22 See John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 609,
618-19 (1999).
23 See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 854-59 (2000). For other accounts of
procreative liberty rejecting Professor Robertson's view, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS
WRONGDOING 328 (1988); MARY WARNOCK, MAKING BABIES 85 (2002); Dan W. Brock, Procre-
ative Liberty, 74 TEX. L. REV. 187, 205 (1995) (reviewing CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 18);
Ronald M. Green, Parental Autonomy and the Obligation Not to Harm One's Child Genetically,
25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 10 (1997); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Harming Future Persons: Obligations to
the Children of Reproductive Technology, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375, 383-84 (1999); Radhika
Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1464 (2008).
24 Garrison, supra note 23, at 855.
25 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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voiding parental consents obtained prenatally, permitting re-
scission of parental consent within stated time limits, and re-
quiring adoption through an intermediary agency.26
Logically, if regulation of adoption is constitutionally permissible to
safeguard the interests of the adoptive child, her biological parents,
and would-be adoptive parents, so is regulation of reproductive tech-
nology aimed at protecting the various actors involved and any chil-
dren that might be produced.
Second, even if Professor Robertson is right that reproductive lib-
erty entails the same level of protection for coital and noncoital repro-
duction-and logic certainly does support this basic claim-
reproductive liberty obviously does not extend to procreative options
unavailable to individuals who procreate coitally. Those who procre-
ate coitally cannot become parents postmenopause or postmortem;
they cannot become parents without a partner who will also become a
parent; they cannot select their future child's sex, determine that
child's traits, or give the child a genetic code identical to their own.
Given these biological limitations on coital conception, state reg-
ulation that forbids or limits these various technological possibilities
does no more than put those who conceive technologically in the same
position as those who conceive sexually. Indeed, with the exception of
postmenopausal conception, all of the technological possibilities that I
have just described are aimed at achieving a particular type of birth
that circumvents the limitations inherent in sexual conception. Most of
these technologies are aimed not at producing a pregnancy but instead
at producing a particular sort of child. Procreative liberty has tradi-
tionally been conceived as the right to decide whether or not to bear a
child, not the right to select what sort of child one will parent.27 Na-
ture has never conferred such a possibility on prospective parents, and
there is no reason why our courts or legislatures should do so either.
Finally, the Supreme Court's parental rights jurisprudence
strongly supports regulatory standards designed to protect the off-
spring of reproductive technology as well as the public interest. 28 In
26 Garrison, supra note 23, at 858.
27 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (characterizing abortion rights as involving "a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy"); see also Casey. 505 U.S. at 872
(reaffirming right of a woman "to choose to terminate or continue her pregnancy before viabil-
ity"); Bellotti v. Baird. 443 U.S. 622, 640 (1979); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 598-600 (1977).
28 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (concluding that the abortion right "cannot be said to be abso-
lute" and holding that "a State may properly assert important interests in safeguarding health, in
maintaining medical standards, and in protecting potential life").
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Wisconsin v. Yoder,29 the Supreme Court declared that the state may
permissibly limit a parent's constitutionally protected right to direct
the upbringing of her child, even when the exercise of that right is
linked to religious liberty, "if it appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have the potential for
significant social burdens. '30  Applying the logic of Yoder, the Su-
preme Court has upheld state laws restricting child labor,31 and it has
concluded that a federal law forbidding segregation in private schools
does not violate parents' constitutionally protected rights. 32 Lower
federal courts have similarly upheld a wide range of state educational
requirements 33 and health initiatives 34 that constrain parental choice.
Surely, if the state can permissibly restrict postbirth parental choices
that harm children or burden the public, it can also restrict prebirth
parental choices that will harm future children or burden the public.
B. Is ART Regulation Desirable? An Interpretive Approach
The fact that regulation is possible does not, of course, mean that
it is desirable. Regulation can impede technological advances. It can
increase costs. It can create lengthy waiting periods.35 And it can be
ineffective if the technologies curtailed or outlawed here are available
in other, reasonably accessible locations. 36
29 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
30 Id. at 233-34.
31 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944).
32 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976) (refusing to recognize parental right
to educate children in private segregated academies).
33 See, e.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 185 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding
mandatory student participation in survey); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381,
395-96 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding a mandatory dress code); Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d
134, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding a mandatory health curriculum); Littlefield v. Forney Indep.
Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a mandatory uniform policy); Brown v.
Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc. 68 F.3d 525, 532-34 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding a public school's
curriculum despite parents' free exercise rights); Duro v. Dist. Attorney, Second Judicial Dist. of
N.C., 712 F.2d 96, 99 (4th Cir. 1983) (upholding a compulsory education law).
34 See, e.g., Anspach v. City of Phila., 503 F.3d 256, 268-69 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that a
publicly funded program which provided plaintiffs' daughter with the "morning after" pill with-
out parental notification or consent did not violate parental rights); Parents United for Better
Schs., Inc. v. Phila. Bd. of Educ., 148 F.3d 260, 275 (3d Cir. 1998) (upholding a voluntary con-
dom-distribution program); Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168-69 (6th Cir. 1980) (finding that a
publicly funded program providing sex education to minors did not violate parental rights).
35 For a description of such problems in another context, see U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH.
ASSESSMENT, INDUSTRY, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: COMPETITIVE CHALLENGES
AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES 3-6 (1994).
36 See Debora Spar, Reproductive Tourism and the Regulatory Map, 352 NEw ENG. J.
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The U.K. experience offers an example of the last two problems.
The U.K. largely outlaws payment to ova donors, 37 with the result that
demand for donated ova exceeds supply.38 A woman who wants to
undergo IVF with donated ova thus must wait to get to the top of the
list. But some British women, watching the reproductive clock tick
on, decide to cut the queue by coming to the free-market U.S.39 These
women typically pay a lot to do so, restricting this queue-cutting op-
tion to the well-off.40 And because only well-off women can evade the
U.K. regulatory framework, the result is a two-tier system in which
access to donated-ova IVF services is determined in part by socioeco-
nomic status, certainly not what U.K. regulators intended.
The U.K. example demonstrates that a single U.S. jurisdiction
probably cannot regulate reproductive technology effectively. To the
extent that citizens of State A want a technique or possibility that is
outlawed in State A but available in State B, State A's citizens will
simply flock to State B and feather the nests of its reproductive tech-
nology centers. 41 Successful regulation thus will almost certainly re-
quire action at the federal level. Federal, instead of state, regulation is
also desirable in order to ensure consistent regulatory standards.
Of course, the fact that federal regulation is preferable to state
regulation begs the important substantive questions: Is any regulation
desirable? If yes, what sort?
In my view, the first place to which we should turn in resolving
these questions is related areas of law. ART is a means of becoming a
parent; the obvious source of policy guidance on parentage issues is
parentage law, including the law of paternity and adoption.42 ART
often involves the transfer of pre-embryos, sperm, and ova from bio-
MED. 531, 532 (2005) (describing a "patchwork of competing and conflicting regulations" and
resulting reproductive tourism).
37 See Payments for Donors, supra note 14.
38 See Helena Echlin, How Much Would You Pay for This?, THE GUARDIAN, July 25, 2005,
http://lifeandhealth.guardian.co.ukhealth/story/0,,1611407,00.html (reporting that 90% of British
infcrtility centers report a shortage of donated ova).
39 See Martyn Halle, This Woman Was Unable to Conceive So She Spent Her GBP 15,000
Savings Buying Eggs from a Mystery Woman in America. But Is This Really the Way to Treat
Infertility?, DAILY MAIL, Mar. 7, 2000, at 40.
40 See id.; see also Echlin, supra note 38.
41 See, e.g., Spar, supra note 36, at 531 (identifying examples of reproductive tourism).
Reproductive tourism may also occur when services are cheaper in another location. See, e.g.,
My IVF Alternative, http://www.myivfalternative.com/ivf-treatment-costs (last visited July 1,
2008) (advertising $6,000 IVF treatments in Czech Republic along with "spa treatments, sight-
seeing, dining, movies, wine tasting, brewery tours, day trips, shopping and more").
42 See Garrison, supra note 23, at 878-82.
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logical progenitors to would-be social parents; adoption law and laws
governing the transfer of other body parts and tissues are logical
sources of policy guidance on the need for and scope of ART transfer
rules. ART invariably involves one or more medical procedures-
some simple, some complex, and some experimental-that may create
risks to the individuals involved and to the children that are produced;
laws governing medical choices and risks outside the ART context are
the most obvious sources of guidance for regulations aimed at ART.
I have written at length elsewhere on why this "interpretive" ap-
proach is a desirable one.43 Although the pursuit of consistency "can
require us to support legislation we believe would be inappropriate in
the perfectly just and fair society and to recognize rights we do not
believe people would have there,' 44 when we adopt a new regulatory
ideal in an arbitrarily defined category of cases, we risk creating what
Professor Ronald Dworkin has aptly described as "checkerboard"
law:
Do the people of North Dakota disagree whether justice re-
quires compensation for product defects that manufacturers
could not reasonably have prevented? Then why should
their legislature not impose this "strict" liability on manufac-
turers of automobiles but not on manufacturers of washing
machines? Do the people of Alabama disagree about the
morality of racial discrimination? Why should their legisla-
ture not forbid racial discrimination on buses but permit it in
restaurants? 45
Checkerboard law violates the ethical norm that like cases receive like
treatment and denies "what is often called 'equality before the law.' ,,46
Checkerboard law also sends conflicting signals that reduce the law's
capacity to express and support underlying public values.
Obviously, ART involves novel reproductive techniques.
However,
[f]or purposes of a parental status rule, the differences be-
tween sexual and technological conception are like the dif-
ferences between restaurants and buses-they are irrelevant
to the values and policy goals that underlie the choice of a
decision-making standard. Parentage law regulates the for-
mation of family relationships, not the mechanics of concep-
43 See id. at 872-76.
44 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-77 (1986).
45 Id. at 178.
46 Id. at 185.
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tion. The law has never cared whether sperm and ovum met
in a fallopian tube or in the uterus; there is no obvious rea-
son why it should care if sperm and ovum meet in a petri
dish. What matters are the relational interests that ulti-
mately result. And there is simply no evidence that techno-
logical conception is creating genuinely new family forms.47
Because the mechanical differences between sexual and technological
conception are irrelevant to the policy concerns that underlie parent-
age determination, the regulation of parentage for children born
through ART should be based on the same goals and values that ani-
mate the larger law of parentage; rules specific to the ART context
should, to the extent possible, be consistent with this larger regulatory
framework. Similarly, if the regulatory problem is medical choice, or
the transfer of body parts and tissues, then ART regulation should be
based on goals, policies, and regulatory strategies consistent with
these other areas of law. I have dealt with the parentage issues that
arise from use of ART extensively elsewhere. 48 In this Article, I focus
on medical choice and transfer issues.
II. Applying the Interpretive Approach:
The Problem of Medical Choice
Because the norms of equality and consistency require similar
regulatory standards across fields that pose similar regulatory
problems, an important threshold question is whether and how ART
poses regulatory issues that are significantly different from those
posed in other medical contexts. Unless there is something special
about the medical choices that arise in ART that requires rules differ-
ent from those applicable to other medical specialties, we do not want
unique standards applicable to this-or any other-field of medical
practice.
A. The Regulatory Background
Today, across all areas of medical practice, the law of medical
choice is dominated by the principle of patient autonomy. Courts
have long held that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body"49
and, based on this principle, they have uniformly concluded that the
47 Garrison, supra note 23, at 880.
48 See generally id.
49 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on other
grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
20081 1631
The George Washington Law Review
physician who treats a patient without his consent is liable for bat-
tery.50  More recently, courts have developed the doctrine of "in-
formed consent" to protect the patient's right to make a decision
based on accurate information about the risks and benefits of a partic-
ular procedure;51 a physician's failure to accurately describe material
risks and benefits is actionable if the patient can show that he or she
detrimentally relied on an erroneous risk/benefit statement.52
Most of our current, very limited regulatory restraints on patient
choice aim primarily at ensuring genuinely informed decisionmaking.
The federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 53 ("FDCA"), which cre-
ated the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") and gave it the au-
thority to deny access to drugs and medical devices found to be unsafe
or ineffective, 54 was enacted to protect the public from a range of risks
that, as a result of erroneous labeling or substandard testing, users
could not themselves identify.55 Federal regulations governing medi-
cal research were similarly aimed at ensuring genuinely informed con-
sent to participation in medical research. 56
Both the FDCA and federal medical research regulations do go
beyond mandating informed consent. The FDCA empowers the FDA
to reject risky drugs and medical devices,57 and the medical research
50 See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 189-90 (Minn. 1958) (holding
that a patient cannot be operated on, absent exigent circumstances, without express or implied
consent). See generally Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381, 381-87 (1957) (analyzing doctor liability for unauthorized
medical treatment).
51 The informed-consent claim was first recognized in Canterbury v. Spence, 454 F.2d 772,
779-81 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1972). For detailed accounts
of the history and theory of informed consent, see generally RUTH R. FADEN, TOM L.
BEAUCHAMP & NANCY M.P. KING, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986);
Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994).
52 See generally Cobbs, 502 P.2d 1; Canterbury, 454 F.2d 772.
53 Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
54 See id. § 355(d); see also 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50-314.91 (2006) (drugs); id. §§ 800-898
(medical devices).
55 See F.D.A., The Story of the Laws Behind the Labels: Part 1 1938-The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA CONSUMER, June 1981, available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/
historla.html [hereinafter The Laws Behind the Labels].
56 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.107-46.111 (2006) (Institutional Review Board requirements); id.
§§ 46.116-46.117 (informed consent requirements); id. § 46.115 (recordkeeping). The regula-
tions include special requirements for research involving pregnant women and/or fetuses. See 45
C.F.R. §§ 46.203-46.204 (2007). For a historical account of the development of the regulations,
see generally Eric J. Cassell, The Principles of the Belmont Report Revisited: How Have Respect
for Persons, Beneficence, and Justice Been Applied to Clinical Medicine, HASTINoS CENTER RPT.,
July-Aug. 2000, at 12 (Vol. 30, No. 4).
57 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
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regulations disallow research that an institutional review board has
determined to create unnecessary risk.58 But these limitations on pa-
tient choice are the exceptions that prove the rule: the autonomy
model creates a presumption in favor of unfettered decisionmaking
and, with respect to virtually all aspects of medical practice, that is
what we have.59
In keeping with the principle of patient autonomy, most medical
decisions-in gastroenterology, gynecology, ART, and across the full
spectrum of medical practice-are not subject to any governmental
regulation whatsoever. In the United States today, the doctor who
wants to offer her patient a particular treatment, even an experimen-
tal treatment, is free to do so unconstrained by any governmental rule
or regulatory agency. Of course, the physician must obtain the pa-
tient's informed consent to the treatment in question,60 but she need
not do more: the surgeon who pioneers a new operation, the physician
who favors an unproven treatment, the researcher who is willing to
offer an experimental treatment to patients unwilling to become re-
search subjects are all free to provide their services to any and all
comers.
The vast discretion that physicians and patients enjoy imposes
costs on the public and even on patients themselves. One of these
costs is the large service disparities from one part of the country to the
next; in the early 1990s, for example, the proportion of women with
early-stage breast cancer who underwent breast-conserving surgery in-
stead of a mastectomy ranged from 1% in Rapid City, South Dakota,
to 48% in Elyria, Ohio.61 Another cost is excessive use of unproven
and sometimes dangerous medical treatments. For example, during
the 1990s, some 40,000 American women with late-stage breast cancer
eschewed conventional chemotherapy in favor of high-dosage chemo-
therapy followed by an autologous bone marrow transplant ("HDCT-
ABMT"). 62 These women typically underwent HDCT-ABMT-an
58 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111.
59 The regulatory anomalies can be explained by the fact that both the federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act and the federal rules governing medical research were passed in response to
widely publicized scandals involving the imposition of large risks on unsuspecting individuals.
See The Laws Behind the Labels, supra note 55; see also MARSHA GARRISON & CARL E. SCHNEI-
DER, THE LAW OF BIOETHICS: INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY AND SOCIAL REGULATION 10 (2003)
(medical research regulations).
60 See GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 59, at 27-70 (describing law of informed
consent).
61 See DARTMOUTH ATLAS PROJECT, PREFERENCE-SENSITIVE CARE 1-2 (2007), http://
www.dartmouthatlas.org/topics/preference-sensitive.pdf.
62 See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, The Controversy over High-Dose Chemo-
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experimental, debilitating, and high-risk treatment-on the advice of
their physicians, and they avoided clinical trials because of promising
early research results. 63 Yet, ultimately, after the expenditure of about
$3 billion and the loss of untold amounts of quality of life, completed
clinical trials showed that HDCT-ABMT was no more effective-and
possibly more harmful-than conventional treatment. 64 Similarly,
millions of postmenopausal women opted for hormone replacement
therapy based on physician representations that such therapy would
improve their quality of life and reduce the risk of heart disease. But
these decisions were made before clinical trials established that hor-
mone replacement therapy was actually associated with increased risk
of heart disease and other adverse outcomes.65
These two examples are far from unique, and they suggest that
exclusive reliance on the decisionmaking of individual patients and
physicians as a means of screening out inappropriate treatments is
problematic not only in the field of reproductive medicine, but also in
a wide range of other health-care contexts. As two medical research-
ers reviewing the HDCT-ABMT debacle put it, "[E]stablishing what
is 'experimental' is an important role for government .... Given the
increasingly commercial nature of medicine, we can expect aggressive
promotion of new therapies. Without authoritative statements saying
otherwise, benefit will be presumed and enrollment in randomised tri-
als will suffer. '66
Current ART practice presents regulatory issues very much like
those that we see in the breast cancer treatment and hormone replace-
ment therapy examples: ART practitioners may offer experimental
treatments before clinical trials have been completed without any ef-
fort to enroll patients in those trials, and some of these experimental
treatments may pose risks to adult patients or their children. Con-
sider the practice of intracytoplasmic sperm injection ("ICSI"), a now-
common ART service that permits would-be parents to create a pre-
therapy with Autologous Bone Marrow Transplant for Breast Cancer, 20 HEALTH AFF. 101, 101
(2001).
63 See id. at 102-03.
64 See Peter D. Jacobson et al., Litigating the Science of Breast Cancer Treatment, 32 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 785, 785 (2007); D.T. Vogl & E.A. Stadtmauer, High-Dose Chemother-
apy and Autologous Hematopoietic Stem Cell Transplantation for Metastatic Breast Cancer: A
Therapy Whose Time Has Passed, 37 BONE MARROW TRANSPLANTATION 985, 985-86 (2006).
65 See U.S. DEPT. oF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACTS ABOUT MENOPAUSAL HORMONE
THERAPY 1, 6-11 (2005), available at http://www.nhlIbi.nih.gov/health/women/pht-facts.pdf.
66 H. Gilbert Welch & Juliana Mogielnicki, Presumed Benefit: Lessons from the American
Experience with Marrow Transplantation for Breast Cancer, 324 BMJ 1088, 1091 (2002).
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embryo with a single active spermatazoa. 67 ICSI has enabled men
with very low sperm counts to become parents. Early research sug-
gested that children created with ICSI had significantly higher levels
of birth defects.68 The most recent research, however, is fairly reassur-
ing; although researchers have continued to report significantly larger
numbers of congenital birth defects among ICSI children,69 in one
study of eight-year-olds, most of the defects had been corrected with
"minor" surgery, and the ICSI children did not require more remedial
therapy, surgery, or hospitalization than children in the control
group.70 Moreover, researchers comparing the cognitive, behavioral,
and motor development of ICSI children and controls at five, eight,
and ten years of age have found no significant differences. 71 Many
years, however, passed between the introduction of ICSI and the pub-
67 See Jennifer J. Kurinczuk & Carol Bower, Birth Defects in Infants Conceived by Intra-
cytoplasmic Sperm Injection: An Alternative Interpretation, 315 BMJ 1260, 1260 (1997); David M.
Nudell & Larry I. Lipshultz, Is Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection Safe? Current Status and Future
Concerns, 2 CURRENT UROLOGY REP. 423, 423 (2001).
68 See, e.g., M. Bonduelle et al., Incidence of Chromosomal Aberrations in Children Born
After Assisted Reproduction Through Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, 13 HUM. REPROD. 781,
781 (1998); ESHRE Capri Workshop Group, Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection (ICSI) in 2006:
Evidence and Evolution, 13 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 515, 521 (2007); Kurinczuk & Bower, supra
note 67, at 1260-63.
69 See, e.g., F. Belva et al., Medical Outcome of 8-Year-Old Singleton ICSI Children (Born
32 Weeks' Gestation) and a Spontaneously Conceived Comparison Group, 22 HUM. REPROD.
506, 511 (2007); M. Bonduelle et al., A Multi-Centre Cohort Study of the Physical Health of 5-
Year-Old Children Conceived After Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, In Vitro Fertilization and
Natural Conception, 20 HUM. REPROD. 413, 417 (2005) (reporting that malformation rate for
ICSI children was 2.8 times higher than that of control group); I. Sanchez-Albisua et al., In-
creased Frequency of Severe Major Anomalies in Children Conceived by Intracytoplasmic Sperm
Injection, 49 DEVELOPMENTAL MED. & CHILD NEUROLOGY 129, 133-34 (2007) (finding higher
frequency of severe congenital anomalies in a small sample of ICSI children); see also Mich~le
Hansen et al., The Risk of Major Birth Defects After Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection and In
Vitro Fertilization, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 725, 729 (2002).
70 See Belva et al., supra note 69, at 511-14.
71 See L. Leunens et al., Cognitive and Motor Development of 8-Year-Old Children Born
After ICSI Compared to Spontaneously Conceived Children, 21 HUM. REPROD. 2922, 2927
(2006); L. Leunens et al., Follow-Up of Cognitive and Motor Development of 10-Year-Old Single-
ton Children Born After ICSI Compared with Spontaneously Conceived Children, 23 HuM.
REPROD. 105, 109 (2008); I. Ponjaert-Kristoffersen et al., International Collaborative Study of
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection-Conceived, In Vitro Fertilization-Conceived, and Naturally Con-
ceived 5-Year-Old Child Outcomes: Cognitive and Motor Assessments, 115 PEDIATRICS e283,
e287-88 (2005) (finding, at five years, no significant differences in cognitive and motor develop-
ment of ICSI children and controls); see also Marjolein Knoester et al., Matched Follow-Up
Study of 5-8 Year Old ICSI-Singletons: Comparison of Their Neuromotor Development to IVF
and Naturally Conceived Singletons, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1638, 1643-44 (2007) (finding no signifi-
cant differences after controlling for maternal age and parity); Isabelle Place & Yvon Englert, A
Prospective Longitudinal Study of the Physical, Psychomotor, and Intellectual Development of
Singleton Children Up to 5 Years Who Were Conceived by Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection Coin-
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lication of these reassuring research results, during which ICSI was
used to produce tens of thousands of children.72 Prudence certainly
calls for the completion of clinical trials before thousands of future
children are placed at risk.
But are the risks of ICSI significantly different from those inher-
ent in HDCT-ABMT? If patients are perfectly free to elect risky,
costly medical treatments for breast cancer, should they not also be
free to elect risky, potentially costly medical treatments for infertility?
Many experts argue that patients should be free to elect neither type
of experimental treatment until research trials have been completed
and, certainly, if government regulators ultimately heed their call,
there is no reason to exclude ART from the range of experimental
treatments covered in a regulatory scheme. But is there reason to sin-
gle out ART for special regulatory treatment?
B. ART and Obstetrics: Similarities, Differences, and Regulatory
Issues
1. Risks to Potential Beings
One cannot distinguish ART from other medical specialties on
the basis of risk to adult patients or on the basis of public cost; high
risks and high costs are apparent both in ART and in other medical
contexts, like HDCT-ABMT versus conventional cancer treatment.
ART, however, has the capacity to impose risks not just on adult pa-
tients, but also on the potential beings that these adults may bring into
the world. These risks to potential beings distinguish ART from most
areas of medical practice, where a medical choice typically affects the
health of the patient alone.73
Risk to potential beings does not distinguish ART from the field
of obstetrics, however, which may also impose risks on potential be-
ings who cannot themselves consent to the treatment in question. In-
deed, some standard obstetrical practices, such as amniocentesis and
pared with Children Conceived Spontaneously and by In Vitro Fertilization, 80 FERTILITY & STE-
RILITY 1388, 1395-95 (2003).
72 See Int'l Comm. for Monitoring Assisted Reprod. Tech. (ICMART), World Collabora-
tive Report on In Vitro Fertilization, 2000, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1586, 1606 (2006).
73 Indeed, when a medical decision does have the potential to significantly affect the
health of others, numerous restrictions on individual choice apply; if the patient has a communi-
cable disease, he or she may be quarantined, isolated, or subjected to mandatory testing and
treatment. See Howard Markel et al., Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by US Cit-
ies During the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic, 298 JAMA 644, 644, 654 (2007); Wendy E.
Parmet, Legal Power and Legal Rights-Isolation and Quarantine in the Case of Drug-Resistant
Tuberculosis, 357 NEw ENG. J. MED. 433, 434 (2007).
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chorionic villi testing, create known risks to the fetus a woman is car-
rying without any corollary benefit to that fetus. 74 The entire point of
these procedures is to inform the pregnant woman's decision whether
to carry the fetus to term or abort it.75 These procedures are usually
effective, and the evidence suggests that pregnant women use the in-
formation the procedures produce to avoid the birth of handicapped
children. For example, surveys show that 80-90% of Down syndrome
pregnancies that are detected prenatally are terminated through abor-
tion.76 Similarly, large numbers of would-be parents selectively abort
fetuses based on evidence that they will be born with a genetically
linked illness or defect.77 Although we have no evidence that would-
be parents in the United States selectively abort fetuses based on the
fetus's sex, most states permit sex-selection abortion,78 and this type of
abortion occurs with some frequency in countries with strong patriar-
chal values such as China and India.79
In the current regulatory climate, the fact that a particular artifi-
cial reproductive technique poses risks to or harms the pre-embryo
thus cannot, in and of itself, justify state regulation. If parents can
freely select out unwanted fetuses through abortion, there is no obvi-
ous reason why they should not also be able to select out unwanted
fetuses through ART techniques such as preimplantation genetic diag-
nosis ("PGD").
If legislators want to disallow the use of PGD to choose offspring
characteristics, they should also disallow such choices when made on
the basis of amniocentesis, chorionic villi testing, or ultrasound. In-
deed, there is more reason to restrict trait selection by means of these
obstetrical technologies than there is to restrict trait selection through
PGD; obstetrical trait selection will invariably depend on the abortion
74 See A. Antsaklis et al., Second-Trimester Amniocentesis vs. Chorionic Villus Sampling
for Prenatal Diagnosis in Multiple Gestations, 20 ULTRASOUND OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
476, 478-79 (2002); Bruno Brambati & Lucia Tului, Chorionic Villus Sampling and Amni-
ocentesis, 17 CURRENT OPINION OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 197, 197 (2005).
75 See Antsaklis et al., supra note 74, at 480.
76 See Mathias B. Forrester & Ruth D. Mertz, Prenatal Diagnosis and Elective Termination
of Down Syndrome in a Racially Mixed Population in Hawaii, 1987-1996, 19 PRENATAL DIAG-
NOSIS 136, 136-37 (1999) (84%); Caroline Mansfield et al., Termination Rates After Prenatal
Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner and Klinefelter Syn-
dromes: A Systematic Literature Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 808, 808 (1999) (91-93%).
77 See Mansfield et al., supra note 76, at 810.
78 Illinois and Pennsylvania, however, have outlawed sex-selection abortion. See 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 510/6-8 (West 2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (West 2008).
79 See Gudrun Schultz, 7,000 Unborn Girls Die from Sex-Selection Abortion Daily in India,
LIFESITENEWS.coM, Dec. 14, 2006, http://www.lifesitenews.com/ldn/2006/dec/06121401.html.
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of a live and growing fetus, while PGD trait selection occurs through
nonimplantation of a pre-embryo that might not have been used and,
even if used, might not have produced a viable pregnancy. An ap-
proach like that is contained in the European Convention on Bi-
omedicine and Human Rights, which forbids "[t]he use of techniques
of medically assisted procreation .. .for the purpose of choosing a
future child's sex, except where serious hereditary sex-related dis-
ease, '80 but says absolutely nothing about abortion for the same pur-
pose and is thus, in my view, seriously underinclusive. Surely, if sex
selection by PGD is against public policy, so is sex selection by
abortion.
That is not to say that a regulatory regime could not or should not
eliminate sex selection across the board. In countries with existing sex
imbalances, there are strong reasons to outlaw sex selection by any
means. 8' Although it is unlikely that sex selection would significantly
affect the gender balance in advanced societies like the United States,
some survey evidence does show a preference for male-first births; if
enough would-be parents used sex selection in this way, the results
might plausibly skew birth-order advantages and significantly alter
family life.82 Choosing a future child's sex might also subtly alter the
parent-child relationship; children born the old-fashioned way are
gifts, but a child whose sex has been selected is the product of a bar-
gained-for exchange.8 3
80 See Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, supra note 13, art. 14. Some coun-
tries that have not ratified the treaty, for example the U.K., also have similar regulatory policies.
81 In China, 118 boys were born for every 100 girls in 2005, and some experts project an
excess of 30 million males in less than 15 years. Denise Grady, Girl or Boy? As Fertility Technol-
ogy Advances, so Does an Ethical Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at F5.
82 See generally Lisa Belkin, Getting the Girl, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 25, 1999, at 38; see
also Ashley Bumgarner, A Right to Choose? Sex Selection in International Context, 14 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 1289, 1290 (2007) (reporting survey data showing that 25% of Americans
say they would use sex selection if it were available); BBC, Baby Sex Selection, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/dna/h2g2/A939918 (last visited July 1, 2008) (reporting U.S. survey evidence showing that
81% of women and 94% of men wanted their first child to be a boy). Other research finds no
such preference. See Ronald Bailey, Sexing Babies: Will Sex Selection Create a Violent World
Without Women?, REASON MAG., Oct. 6, 2004, http://www.reason.com/news/show/34895.html
(summarizing research). Some research suggests that birth order is related to IQ and other
advantages. See, e.g., Susan M. Faust, Baby Girl or Baby Boy? Now You Can Choose. A Look at
New Biology and No Law, 10 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 281, 290 (2000) (summarizing research);
Human Intelligence: Does Birth Order Affect Intelligence?, http:llwww.indiana.edu/-intellbirth
Order.shtml (last visited June 10, 2008) (same).
83 Cf Peter Herissone-Kelly, Parental Love and the Ethics of Sex Selection, 16 CAMBRIDGE
Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 326, 326, 334 (2007); R. McDougall, Acting Parentally: An Argument
Against Sex Selection, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 601, 603-04 (2005).
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The issues that sex-selection regulation must reach are too com-
plex to be addressed this Article. 84 My point here is simply that the
regulatory issues posed by sex selection are not unique to ART; regu-
lation that restricts trait determination in ART thus should logically
apply to the abortion context as well. If the legislature does decide to
outlaw sex selection-or any other form of prebirth trait selection-it
thus should adopt standards that apply to both ART and standard ob-
stetrical practice.
A legislature that has decided to outlaw sex selection or some
other form of trait determination could, however, appropriately create
a regulatory scheme that focuses primarily on ART. Although sex
selection through abortion and sex selection through PGD pose the
same public concerns, would-be parents are much more likely to use
PGD for sex selection than they are to abort a viable pregnancy-the
same ultrasound photograph that reveals fetal sex will also reveal in-
fant-like features, and many, if not most, would-be parents who want
a child of a given sex will be reluctant to go so far as aborting a live
and growing fetus in order to attain that end. By- contrast, PGD typi-
cally involves the nonselection of one or more pre-embryos in a con-
text where only some pre-embryos would be implanted in any event,
and none is guaranteed to produce a pregnancy, let alone a live
birth.8 5 New "sperm sorting" techniques do not even involve a pre-
embryo;8 6 sex selection through this approach may well feel, to many
users, much like older (and largely useless) methods of upping the
odds of having a baby of a particular gender by timing intercourse or
consuming a folk "remedy." Because of these contextual differences,
many individuals who would not consider abortion for purposes of sex
selection will be willing to consider, and use, ART. If we want to
avoid harms associated with sex selection, the need for regulation thus
is greatest in the ART context.
Of course, if proscriptive rules are warranted in the ART context,
they will also be warranted in the abortion context given the larger
harm that abortion entails. Whatever restrictions on trait determina-
84 Book-length manuscripts are available. See, e.g., President's Council on Bioethics, Sex
Selection Index, http://www.bioethics.gov/topics/sex index.html (last visited July 1, 2008)
(presenting transcripts and papers on sex selection).
85 Cf U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2005 ASSISTED REPRO-
DUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) REPORT: SECTION 5-ART TRENDS, 1996-2005, at fig.50, http://
www.cdc.gov/art/ART2005/section5.htm [hereinafter 2005 ART REPORT] (reporting that, in
2005, 34% of pre-embryo transfers using fresh, nondonor eggs resulted in live births).
86 See Genetics & IVF Institute, MicroSort, http://microsort.net/ (last visited July 1, 2008)
(describing sperm sorting process).
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tion are deemed appropriate in ART practice thus should also be ap-
plied to abortion when used for the same purposes.
2. Risks to Future Children
Both ART and obstetrical practice impose risks not only on po-
tential beings whom adult patients may elect not to bring into the
world, but also on future children whom adult patients have decided
to bear and raise. ICSI, described earlier, offers one example of an
ART practice presenting this type of risk: when deciding to employ
ICSI, would-be parents create a pre-embryo that they hope to implant
and bring to term.87 The use of ICSI imposes a significantly higher
risk of birth defects than does sexual conception or standard IVF.88
Obstetrical practice sometimes creates similar risks: the doctor may
prescribe fertility drugs that, like ICSI, improve the probability of a
pregnancy but at the same time create risks to fetal life that are not
present with "normal" conception.89 In this regard, the doctor may
prescribe drugs that benefit the patient but create risks to the fetus.
The risks inherent in ICSI, fertility drugs, and similar practices
pose regulatory issues quite different from those created by diagnostic
procedures designed to inform the decisionmaking of would-be par-
ents about whether to carry a given pre-embryo or fetus to term.
Once a pre-embryo or fetus has been selected for birth, the state has
an interest, grounded in both the public good and the principle of
equality, in providing this future child with protections against health
risks that are comparable to those that the state offers to current chil-
dren.90 The burden of harm that occurs prebirth is often just as great
as that which occurs postbirth.91 And a future child is just as vulnera-
ble and incapable of legally consenting to health risks as an actual
child.
When the health and safety of a future child are at stake, the state
not only has a much larger interest in protecting the future child than
it does in the case of a pre-embryo selected for destruction, but ex-
isting laws and regulations are much more supportive of state inter-
87 See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
88 See id.
89 See Norbert Gleicher et al., Reducing the Risk of High-Order Multiple Pregnancy After
Ovarian Stimulation with Gonadotropins, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2, 6 (2000).
90 For similar views, see, e.g., DEBORAH MATHIEU, PREVENTING PRENATAL HARM:
SHOULD THE STATE INTERVENE? 46-51 (2d ed. 1996). Some commentators have also argued
that a prospective parent who decides to bear a particular child thereby assumes responsibilities
to that future child. See, e.g., id. at 55-57.
91 See infra text accompanying notes 106-15.
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vention. State neglect laws invariably authorize the state to overrule a
parental health care choice that subjects the child to a substantial
health risk,92 and some state neglect laws explicitly, or by judicial in-
terpretation, apply to in utero risks. 93 Similarly, state wrongful death
laws have typically been interpreted to protect against loss of fetal
life,94 and many state criminal statutes apply to fetal injuries and
death.95
Federal law also imposes substantial limits on a parent's right to
subject his child to health risks. Federal regulations permit medical
research using child subjects, without national review, only if the re-
search offers a direct therapeutic benefit, if it involves only minimal
risk, or if the risk involves only a "minor increase over minimal risk"
and the research offers the potential for "generalizable knowledge...
of vital importance for the understanding or amelioration of the sub-
jects' disorder or condition. '96 Moreover, federal law severely limits
parents' decisionmaking role in the care provided for newborns.
Under the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Amendments of
198497 ("CAPTA"), federally funded hospitals (which are virtually all
hospitals) may not withhold "medically indicated treatment" to a neo-
nate except in severely constrained circumstances, 98 and "subjective
92 See generally Sanford N. Katz et al., Child Neglect Laws in America, 9 FAM. L.Q. 1
(1975); Elizabeth J. Sher, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between
Parents and the State, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1983).
93 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.5562 (West 2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-20A-63
(2004); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.01(1)(am), 48.01(2)(bm), 48.02(1)(am) (West 2008).
94 See Dena M. Marks, Person v. Potential: Judicial Struggles to Decide Claims Arising
from the Death of an Embryo or Fetus and Michigan's Struggle to Settle the Question, 37 AKRON
L. REV. 41, 45-74 (2004) (reviewing case law by jurisdiction).
95 See Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A Survey of
Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1845, 1872-73 (2000).
96 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.404-46.406 (2007). "Minimal risk means that the probability and mag-
nitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves
than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or
psychological examinations or tests." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2006).
97 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98
Stat. 1749 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1515 (2000)).
98 Under CAPTA,
[W]ithholding of medically indicated treatment means the failure to respond to the
infant's life-threatening conditions by providing treatment . . . which . . . will be
most likely to be effective in ameliorating or correcting all such conditions, except
that the term does not include the failure to provide treatment . . . to an infant
when ... (A) the infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose; (B) the provision
of such treatment would (i) merely prolong dying; (ii) not be effective in ameliorat-
ing or correcting all of the infant's life-threatening conditions; or (iii) otherwise be
futile in terms of the survival of the infant; or (C) the provision of such treatment
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opinions about the future 'quality of life' of a retarded or disabled
person" are "not sanction [ed]. '"99
To the extent that ART-or obstetrical practice-imposes risks
on future children equivalent to those that state and federal law disal-
low for actual children, there is a sound basis for regulation aimed at
providing protection against such hazards. Such regulation is justified
both by the child-protection aims that underlie the various laws I have
just described and by the equivalence of future and current children in
terms of the state's legitimate goals of protecting children from seri-
ous, preventable health risks and protecting the public from the direct
and indirect costs associated with such risks. 100
Regulation aimed at protecting future children seems particularly
important when the treatment in question is aimed at achieving a
sought-after pregnancy. Infertile would-be parents are much less
likely than actual parents, or even pregnant women who have decided
to carry a pregnancy to term, to act in the best interests of their future
children. Infertile patients have typically been unable to conceive sex-
ually, but many feel strongly that they want a genetically related child;
that is why they have elected-often at considerable expense-to un-
dergo IVF, ICSI, or'another fertility treatment. In evaluating the risks
inherent in such treatments, infertile would-be parents are, by neces-
sity, balancing the risks to a future child against the risk of having no
child at all. In making this type of calculation, some, perhaps most,
would-be parents will evaluate risks to the future child differently
than would an impartial observer concerned only with that child's
welfare. 01
The skewed parental risk-calculation possibilities inherent in in-
fertility treatment bear more than a passing resemblance to the paren-
tal risk calculations that motivated the federal CAPTA legislation:
would be virtually futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment
itself under such circumstances would be inhumane.
42 U.S.C.A. § 5106g(6) (West 2003).
99 45 C.F.R. § 1340.20 app. (2004).
100 Cf. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Repro-
duction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 13 (2004) [hereinafter Robertson, Harm to Offspring] (urging
that "[e]nsuring safe and effective use of ARTs should be the goal of ethical practice and sound
public policy. Enabling a child to be born when there is a high risk that the child will be born
harmed or damaged raises moral concerns of great significance."); John A. Robertson, The Right
to Procreate and In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 333, 352 (1982) (urging that
"[p]rosecution for child abuse/neglect could.., be predicated on an injury or impairment to the
child which proximately results from a parental decision not to have an available in utero proce-
dure performed").
101 For an example, see infra text accompanying notes 106-15.
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because the parent of a defective newborn-a child quite different
from the one the parent had planned for and expected-has no estab-
lished relationship with that infant, it is easier for a parent to take his
own interests into account and balance them against those of the in-
fant.10 2 That is an important reason why some parents have failed to
act in the interests of their defective newborns and why Congress
stepped in to ensure that parents could not ignore the medical needs
of handicapped infants. 10 3
Professor Robertson has argued that the so-called "nonidentity
problem" distinguishes the risks inherent in infertility treatments from
those imposed on actual or in utero children. Robertson notes that
children born with handicapping conditions caused by infertility treat-
ment could "not have been wronged or harmed because there was no
other way that they could have been born. ' 104 And Robertson is cer-
tainly right that a child harmed by an infertility treatment would likely
be precluded from bringing a tort action to recover damages for his or
her injuries; most American courts that have considered the issue
have refused to countenance so-called "wrongful life" cases based
largely on the nonidentity problem that Robertson has identified.
The fact that a given child has not suffered a cognizable legal in-
jury, however, does not mean that government regulation is impermis-
sible or unwarranted. An extraordinary range of harms are both
nonactionable by individuals and heavily regulated. Workplace
safety, for example, is extensively regulated even though assumption
of the risk bars most actions by workers, and a range of environmental
hazards-for example, automobile emissions, water contaminants,
and air pollutants-are regulated despite the fact that individuals can
only rarely show personal injuries.
As an example of an issue at which prebirth child-protective reg-
ulation might be aimed, consider the question of how many pre-em-
bryos should be implanted in an IVF procedure. In order to improve
the odds of producing a live birth, ART practitioners often simultane-
ously implant more than one pre-embryo in the prospective mother's
body. These multiple implantations often produce multiple births.
102 See generally Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical Dilemmas in the
Special-Care Nursery, 289 NEW ENG. J. MED. 890 (1973) (discussing cases in which parents of
handicapped neonates chose not to treat curable medical conditions). Despite CAPTA, survey
evidence continues to show substantial support for nontreatment of newborns with genetic disa-
bilities. See Dorothy C. Wertz, Ethical Issues in Pediatric Genetics: Views of Geneticists, Parents
and Primary Care Physicians, 6 HEALTH L.J. 3, 18-19 (1998).
103 See GARRISON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 59, at 594-95.
104 Robertson, Harm to Offspring, supra note 100, at 25.
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Thus, in 2005, 32% of all U.S. IVF births were multiple, compared
with only 2% of births in the general population.10 5
Increased use of IVF has brought with it not only an explosion in
multiple births, 106 but also an explosion in attendant risks to the preg-
nant woman and her children. Some experts estimate that maternal
morbidity is seven times greater in multiple pregnancies than in sin-
gleton deliveries and that perinatal mortality rates are four times
higher for twins and six times higher for triplets and higher-order
births.10 7 Multiple pregnancies are also likely to be premature, thus
increasing the chance of problems associated with low birth weight.
Some studies have found that 12% of IVF singletons, 55% of IVF
twins, and 94% of IVF triplet or higher-order births result in low birth
weight; one-third of triplets and higher-order births result in very low
birth weight (less than 1,500 grams).108
The consequences of prematurity and low birth weight can be se-
rious and long lasting. Prematurity is associated with more than one-
third of all U.S. infant deaths 09 and, worldwide, it is the leading cause
of infant mortality and morbidity. 110 Low-birth-weight infants who
survive infancy are much more likely than others to develop a variety
of impairments, including: cerebral palsy; vision and hearing
problems; and long-term motor, cognitive, behavioral, social-emo-
tional, health, and growth problems.1" Follow-up studies of low-birth-
105 See 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 85, at fig.58. The proportion of singleton IVF births,
however, also has been increasing. From 1996 through 2005, the percentage of IVF transfers
that resulted in singleton live births for fresh nondonor cycles increased 35%. Id. fig.51. Over
the same time period, the percentage of transfers resulting in singleton live births increased 79%
for frozen nondonor cycles, 36% for fresh donor cycles, and 48% for frozen donor cycles. Id.
106 Between 1980 and 1997, the U.S. experienced a 136.6% increase in triplet and higher-
order births. See Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Contribution of Assisted Reproduc-
tion Technology and Ovulation-Inducing Drugs to Triplet and Higher-Order Multiple Births-
United States, 1980-1997, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 535,537 tbl.1 (2000). Some
of this increase reflects a higher average maternal age and the impact of ovulation-inducing
drugs, but CDC has estimated that IVF was responsible for 38.7% of triplet and higher-order
births in 1996 and 43.3% in 1997. Id. at 536 tbl.2.
107 See R.C. Wimalasundera et al., Reducing the Incidence of Twins and Triplets, 17 BEST
PRAC. & RES. CLINICAL OBSTETRICS GYNAECOLOGY 309, 309 (2003).
108 ROYAL COMM'N ON NEW REPROD. TECHS., PROCEED WITH CARE: FINAL REPORT OF
THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCT7ON TECHNOLOGIES 528 (1993).
109 See William L. Callaghan et al., The Contribution of Preterm Birth to Infant Mortality
Rates in the United States, 118 PEDIATRICS 1566, 1571 (2006).
110 Mario Merialdi & Jeffrey C. Murray, The Changing Face of Preterm Birth, 120 PEDIAT-
RICS 1133, 1133 (2007).
111 See generally PRETERM BIRTH: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND PREVENTION 311-45
(Richard E. Behrman & Adrienne Stith Butler eds., 2007) [hereinafter PRETERM BIRTH]; see
also Maureen Hack et al., Long-Term Developmental Outcomes of Low Birth Weight Infants, 5
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weight infants have shown that approximately 20% have serious disa-
bilities; infants with very low birth weights are even more likely to
suffer a major functional impairment.1 2 One study that followed
these very small babies to school revealed that "up to 50 percent of
them scored low on standardized intelligence tests, including 21 per-
cent who were mentally retarded. In addition, nine percent had cere-
bral palsy, and 25 percent had severe vision problems. As a result, 45
percent ended up enrolling in special education programs.' 1 13 Low
birth weight may even produce adverse consequences in mid-life; re-
searchers have reported a connection between low birth weight and
both hypertension and coronary heart disease in middle age.114
Because low birth weight is strongly associated with multiple
births, the likelihood of adverse consequences associated with this
condition are greatly magnified in higher-order pregnancies. For ex-
ample, the chance of a triplet pregnancy resulting in a baby with cere-
bral palsy is 47 times greater than that of a singleton pregnancy; for a
twin pregnancy, it is eight times greater. 115
The various adverse consequences of low birth weight also pro-
duce extraordinary public and private costs. One recent study con-
cludes that the average costs of ART twin births and higher-order
births are three times and more than ten times greater, respectively,
FUTURE CHILD. 176 (1995), available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/information2826/
information show.htm?doc id=79895.
112 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Eight Is Too Many: The Case Against Octuplets, NEW REPUB-
LIC, Jan. 25, 1999, at 8; see also Hack et al., supra note 111; Eric S. Shinwell & Isaac Blickstein,
The Risks for Very Low Birth Weight Infants from Multiple Pregnancies, 34 CLINICS PER-
INATOLOGY 587, 587-88 (2007).
113 Emanuel, supra note 112, at 10. See also Aijaz Farooqi et al., Chronic Conditions, Func-
tional Limitations, and Special Health Care Needs in 10- to 12-Year-Old Children Born at 23 to 25
Weeks' Gestation in the 1990s: A Swedish National Prospective Follow-up Study, 118 PEDIATRICS
e1466, e1466-67 (2006) (reporting,
[Slignificantly more extremely immature children than controls had chronic condi-
tions, including functional limitations (64% vs 11%, respectively), compensatory
dependency needs (59% vs 25%), and services above those routinely required by
children (67% vs 22%). Specific diagnoses or disabilities with higher rates in ex-
tremely immature children than in controls included neurosensory impairment
(15% vs 2%), asthma (20% vs 6%), poor motor skills... (26% vs 3%), poor visual
perception .. .(21% vs 4%), poor learning skills .. .(27% vs 3%), poor adaptive
functioning ... (42% vs 9%), and poor academic performance ... (49% vs 7%).).
114 See Robert W. Fogel & Chulhee Lee, Who Gets Health Care?, 131 DAEDALUS 107, 112
(2002).
115 Nicholas M. Fisk & Geoffrey Trew, Two's Company, Three's a Crowd for Embryo
Transfer, 354 LANCET 1572, 1572 (1999). See also Wimalasundera et al., supra note 107, at 309
(reporting that cerebral palsy rates are 1-1.5% in twin pregnancies and 7-8% in triplet
pregnancies).
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than that of an ART singleton birth. 1 6 This analysis dealt only with
delivery and immediate medical expenses; it did not even attempt .to
place a price tag on the suffering borne by the afflicted child or.the
public costs associated with long-term disability." 7
Because of the clear health hazards associated with multiple im-
plantations, implantation practice is a logical area for child-protective
regulation. Many European nations have already taken this step. The
U.K. has adopted a policy mandating no more than double embryo
transfer ("DET"),118 and Belgium now requires single embryo transfer
("SET") for women under the age of 36 who are undergoing their first
treatment cycle.119
SET ensures single births and thus vastly reduces the probability
of low birth weight and associated harms.120 Some researchers have
also reported no significant difference in pregnancy rates when SET is
used instead of DET.'2' However, the weight of the evidence suggests
that SET may significantly reduce the chances of achieving a preg-
nancy during a given cycle for at least some types of patients 22 and
116 See, e.g., Georgina M. Chambers et al., Babies Born After ART Treatment Cost More
Than Non-ART Babies: A Cost Analysis of Inpatient Birth-Admission Costs of Singleton and
Multiple Gestation Pregnancies, 22 HuM. REPROD. 3108, 3111, 3113 (2007) (reporting that the
average cost of an ART singleton delivery was C4,818 compared with C13,890 for ART twins
and C54,294 for ART higher-order multiples and concluding that the high costs associated with
ART multiple births support single embryo transfer).
117 Cf PRETERM BIRTH, supra note 111, at 398 (estimating that, in 2005, each preterm birth
in the United States cost at least $51,600, including immediate medical expenses, the cost of
early intervention/special education programs, and lost household and labor market productivity
related to some of these disabling conditions).
118 See B.A. Lieberman et al., Presentation of In-Vitro Fertilisation Results, 357 LANCET 397,
397 (2001).
119 P. Donoso et al., Single Embryo Transfer in Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Cycles
for Women <36 Years Does Not Reduce Delivery Rate, 22 HuM. REPROD. 1021, 1021-22 (2007).
120 See Sarah E. Little et al., Cost of Transferring One Through Five Embryos Per In Vitro
Fertilization Cycle from Various Payor Perspectives, 108 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 593, 599
(2006) (finding in one recent study that one-embryo transfers for women younger than 35 years
reduced preterm birth and cerebral palsy rates by 55% and 41%, respectively).
121 See Viveca Soderstrom-Anttila & Sirpa Vilska, Five Years of Single Embryo Transfer
with Anonymous and Non-Anonymous Oocyte Donation, 15 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 428,431
tbl.2 (2007) (reporting delivery rate per embryo transfer of 30.4% for SET and 33.3% for DET
and twin rates of 0% for SET and 40% for DET).
122 See Zabeena Pandian et al., Number of Embryos for Transfer After IVF and ICSI: A
Cochrane Review, 20 HuM. REPROD. 2681, 2682, 2685 (2005); Aafke P.A. van Montfoort et al.,
In Unselected Patients, Elective Single Embryo Transfer Prevents All Multiples, but Results in
Significantly Lower Pregnancy Rates Compared with Double Embryo Transfer: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 21 HuM. REPROD. 338, 341-42 (2006); see also R. Ciriminna et al., Impact of
Italian Legislation Regulating Assisted Reproduction Techniques on ICSI Outcomes in Severe
Male Factor Infertility: A Multicentric Survey, 22 HuM. REPROD. 2481, 2481 (2007) (reporting
that the implantation of a maximum of only three pre-embryos, in ICSI cases, "significantly
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the use of SET appears to conflict with patient preferences. In one
recent survey of "subfertile" women, 54% preferred DET even if SET
produced an identical pregnancy rate, and the percentage favoring
SET fell to 34% if SET lowered the pregnancy rate by as little as
1%.123
In the United States, the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine ("ASRM") has issued nonbinding guidelines that recom-
mend SET for all women under age 35 and either SET or DET for
those under age 38 with a "favorable" prognosis, but the guidelines
permit the implantation of as many as five "cleavage-stage embryos"
for women over age forty.124 The ASRM acknowledges that
"[m]ultiple gestations lead to an increased risk of complications in
both the fetuses and the mothers '125 but nonetheless urges that
"[s]trict limitations on the number of embryos transferred, as required
by law in some countries, do not allow treatment plans to be individu-
alized after careful consideration of each patient's own unique
circumstances." 126
Should we rely on voluntary guidelines like those of the ASRM
to combat the risks of implanting multiple pre-embryos, or should we
turn to government regulation? And if regulation is desirable, should
it go so far as to require SET for some or all women? These are diffi-
cult questions. Voluntary guidelines are consistent with the self-deter-
reduced the number of good-morphology embryos available for transfer" and caused "dramatic
reductions in the [clinical] pregnancy rate ... and the implantation rate," particularly in cases
where the male partner was afflicted with non-obstructive azoospermia).
123 Moniek Twisk et al., Preferences of Subfertile Women Regarding Elective Single Embryo
Transfer: Additional In Vitro Fertilization Cycles Are Acceptable, Lower Pregnancy Rates Are
Not, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1006, 1007 (2007) (reporting also that, if SET lowered pregnancy
rates by 3% or 5%, the percentage of women preferring SET dropped to 24% and 15%, respec-
tively). See also Astrid Hojgaard et al., Patient Attitudes Towards Twin Pregnancies and Single
Embryo Transfer-A Questionnaire Study, 22 HUM. REPROD. 2673, 2677 (2007) (finding that,
among patients at a Danish public fertility clinic where DET was typical and the number of
reimbursed treatments was limited to three, 58.7% of survey respondents preferred having twins
to having one child at a time (37.9%)).
124 See Practice Comm. of the Soc'y for Assisted Reprod. Tech. and Practice Comm. of the
Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Guidelines on Number of Embryos Transferred, 86 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 851, S51 (2006).
125 Id.
126 Id. Cf 2005 ART REPORT, supra note 85, at fig.54 (reporting,
From 1996 to 2005, cycles that involved the transfer of one embryo increased
slightly, from 6% to 9%; cycles that involved the transfer of two embryos increased
dramatically, from 10% in 1996 to 43% in 2005. Cycles that involved the transfer
of three embryos increased from 23% in 1996 to 29% in 2005, and cycles that in-
volved the transfer of four or more embryos decreased from 62% in 1996 to 18% in
2005.).
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mination ideal that underlies the U.S. health care system, but they are
inconsistent with the tradition of limiting parental choice when there
is clear risk to a child's health or safety. Moreover, in practice, "au-
tonomous" decisionmaking on pre-embryo implantation may be bi-
ased by "economic pressures and insurance circumstances, or by
limited patient knowledge about risk factors.' 12 7 Clearly, strict gov-
ernmental rules have greater capacity to reduce multiple births and
their attendant costs. Strict rules, however, risk misclassification of
some couples and thus might needlessly impede those couples'
chances of having genetically related children. In a field in which new
evidence becomes available virtually every month, it is also difficult
for a government regulator to keep up. Indeed, the British rules man-
dating a two pre-embryo maximum might well have looked more like
the Belgian rule mandating single embryo transfer in many cases had
it been drafted even a couple of years later. The ideal surely lies
somewhere between hard-and-fast, hard-to-change proscriptive rules
issued by a legislature or through formal rulemaking and nonbinding,
perhaps self-serving, industry standards.
C. Organ Transplantation as a Regulatory Model
If the ideal regulatory model lies somewhere between hard-and-
fast, hard-to-change governmental rules and nonbinding, probably
self-serving industry standards, what type of regulatory structure
makes the most sense?
In my view, the quasi-public regulatory system currently utilized
for organ donation and implantation offers an excellent model. The
National Organ Transplant Act of 1984128 ("NOTA") established a na-
tional transplant network, to be run by a private, nonprofit entity, that
would maintain regional organ banks and set criteria for donation and
receipt of organs. 129 Since 1986, the nongovernmental United Net-
work for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") has contracted with the federal
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to run this net-
work. 130 The UNOS Board of Directors, composed largely of trans-
127 Norbert Gleicher & David Barad, The Relative Myth of Elective Single Embryo Trans-
fer, 121 HuM. REPROD. 1337, 1338 (2006) (internal citations omitted). In Denmark, the public
health care system reimburses up to three treatment cycles. See Hojgaard et al., supra note 123,
at 2673.
128 National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2000)).
129 42 U.S.C. § 274 (2000).
130 See United Network for Organ Sharing, Who We Are-The OPTN, http://www.unos.
org/whoWeAre/theOPTN.asp (last visited July 1, 2008). Since 2000, a competing nonprofit en-
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plant surgeons, establishes organ policies, but these policies are not
implemented until approved by the HHS Secretary.13' Once imple-
mented, however, UNOS policies are binding on local organ procure-
ment offices. The result is a public-private partnership that operates
transparently and follows uniform standards: UNOS policies deter-
mine how donors are screened and tested, what records are kept, the
procedures by which tissues are matched, the manner in which appli-
cants are placed on waiting lists, and the process by which organs are
allocated. UNOS rules are binding, not advisory, but UNOS rules are
also professionally developed, sophisticated, complex, and regularly
updated. Indeed, UNOS collects, maintains, and analyzes a wealth of
data relevant to transplant policy that is used, along with other rele-
vant research, to refine UNOS rules and ensure the best balance of
risk and benefit.132
A quasi-public entity like UNOS-charged with a unique mission
and staffed by medical professionals-would have the expertise to
craft appropriate, nuanced regulatory standards for ART practice, to
determine when and how those standards require revision, and to ini-
tiate or make use of relevant research. This entity would have the
flexibility to refine these standards as needed, and it would be rela-
tively insulated from political pressures. A quasi-public regulatory en-
tity like UNOS would also seem to be a better fit for the decentralized
system of medical care on which we Americans rely than would a cen-
tral governmental agency like the U.K.'s Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Authority.
I do not mean to suggest that the UNOS model is perfect. Dur-
ing the Clinton Administration, the HHS and UNOS were often at
war. HHS Secretary Donna Shalala and other critics charged that
UNOS had become subservient to the transplant community and that
its organ-allocation policies produced large, and medically needless,
tity, Arbor Research (formerly University Renal Research and Education Association), has as-
sumed responsibility for the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, which assesses and
monitors the data collected by the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network. See Arbor
Research Collaborative for Health, The Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients, http://www.
arborresearch.org/srtr.aspx (last visited July 1, 2008).
131 United Network for Organ Sharing, What We Do-Policy Management, http://unos.org/
whatWeDo/policyManagement/policyDevelopment.asp (last visited July 1, 2008).
132 See United Network for Organ Sharing, What We Do-Research, http://www.unos.org/
whatWeDo/research.asp (last visited July 1, 2008) (indicating UNOS collects all data relevant to
transplants, maintains a comprehensive database containing that information, and analyzes it to
produce research reports).
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geographic disparities in organ availability.133 During this period, the
HHS sought to limit UNOS's authority by imposing on it performance
standards and by requiring approval by the HHS Secretary before a
UNOS rule could be implemented.134 Certainly, any private entity
that makes use of the expertise of interested-and often self-inter-
ested-parties is subject to capture by those parties in a way that may
distort its public mission. Public review like that obtained during the
1990s by the HHS is thus appropriate and probably necessary to en-
sure that this does not happen. The expertise and flexibility built into
the UNOS model are, however, very large virtues in sophisticated,
state-of-the-art medical contexts like organ transplantation. It is hard
to obtain these advantages through any other regulatory alternative,
and these advantages would hold across the spectrum of ART prac-
tices as well.
The creation of an entity like UNOS to regulate ART practices is
warranted, in my view, for two reasons. First, the state has a strong
interest in protecting future persons from preventable risks. This in-
terest arises from the principle of equality, from the state's interests in
ensuring that its citizens are healthy and productive, and from the
state's fiscal interests in reducing the public cost associated with ill
health. Second, as we have seen, some ART practices impose sub-
stantial risks on future children, and there is reason to believe that
would-be parents will be less effective in protecting their future chil-
dren against such risks than are actual parents in protecting children
with whom they have established relationships. 135 Regulation to pro-
tect against this hazard thus seems no less necessary here than in the
context of neonatal care, where extensive restrictions on parental
choice are already in place. 136
In order to ensure consistent treatment of equivalent risks, any
agency that regulates risks arising from ART should also be empow-
ered to regulate analogous risks arising from obstetrical practice. As
we have seen, there is no logical basis for distinguishing between
harms to potential beings or future children based on whether those
harms arise in an ART center or an obstetrician's office. If regulators
decide to outlaw some form of trait determination in ART, they
133 See Martin A. Strosberg & Ron W. Gimbel, The Public Administration of Organ Alloca-
tion: Maintaining the Public-Private Partnership, 7 PUB. ADMIN. & MtMT. 229, 231 (2002).
134 See id.; David L. Weimer, The Puzzle of Private Rulemaking: Expertise, Flexibility, and
Blame Avoidance in U.S. Regulation, 66 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 569, 578 (2006).
135 See supra text accompanying notes 101-02, 106-15.
136 See supra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
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should also outlaw similar practices that take place in the obstetri-
cian's office. Similarly, if regulators decide to take steps to avoid risks
inherent in the implantation of multiple pre-embryos, then they
should also take steps aimed at avoiding risks inherent in ovulation-
inducing fertility drugs prescribed by obstetricians. Although the risk
of a multiple birth is lower with ovulation-inducing drugs than it is
with the implantation of multiple pre-embryos, the ART risk can be
controlled while the fertility-drug risk cannot.137 Indeed, in reporting
on the fertility-drug risk, some experts urge greater use of ART in
order to reduce the risk of multiple births.138 Thus, although ART is
more expensive than fertility-drug treatment, its ultimate social cost
may be lower because of the capacity of ART practitioners to limit
multiple births. Certainly, it makes sense to regulate these risks to-
gether in order to achieve a cohesive policy; indeed, to do otherwise
might create undesirable incentives toward greater use of fertility
drugs with their harder-to-control risks.
III. Applying the Interpretive Approach:
Transfers of Genetic Material
It is perhaps ironic that an entity like UNOS appears to be the
best means of regulating medical risks arising from ART, for UNOS
and NOTA, which produced it, are also obvious starting places for
analyzing regulatory issues arising from transfers of the genetic mate-
rial used in ART. NOTA, enacted in 1984, outlawed the exchange of
valuable consideration for any "human organ," defined to include
"bone marrow, cornea, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof."'1 39 The
Senate Report accompanying NOTA also stated that "human body
parts should not be viewed as commodities .... "140 UNOS was thus
charged with developing a registry of available organs and recipients
who needed those organs;14t it was also charged with the task of devel-
oping allocation criteria. 142
137 See Gleicher et al., supra note 89, at 2.
138 Id. at 6.
139 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2000).
140 S. REp. No. 98-382, at 17 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3982.
141 See United Network for Organ Sharing, supra note 130. But see Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network, About Data: Data Collection, http://www.optn.org/data/about/
collection.asp (last visited July 1, 2008) (indicating that although NOTA defines bone marrow
and skin as organs, the UNOS registry system does not include these body parts).
142 See United Network for Organ Sharing, What We Do-Organ Center, http://www.unos.
org/whatWeDo/organCenter.asp (last visited July 1, 2008).
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UNOS currently has no regulatory role with respect to ova and
sperm because these genetic materials are not classified as "organs"
under NOTA. But an obvious question is why, if "human body parts
should not be viewed as commodities," sperm and ova should be
viewed as commodities.
One possible answer is that genetic materials are renewable re-
sources. 143 At one time, blood was regularly sold; 144 sperm and ova
might arguably be classified in the same way. However, bone marrow
is also a renewable part of the body, and it clearly falls under NOTA's
anticommodification ban.145 And ova, while plentiful, are not
renewable.
Another possible answer is that donation of an organ involves
substantial medical risk. However, NOTA applies to cadaveric as well
as live-donor organs; clearly the statute has more than paternalistic
aims.
Yet another possible answer is that the anticommodification ethic
applies only to potentially life-saving transfers of body parts. How-
ever, corneas, which NOTA does classify as organs, save sight, not life.
Similarly, skin, also classified by NOTA as an organ, is not necessarily
life-saving. And while ova and sperm do not save life, they uniquely
have the power to create it.
A last possible way of distinguishing genetic material from the
body parts to which NOTA applies an anticommodification ethic is in
their market value. Since the early days of artificial insemination,
there have been enough men willing to donate sperm such that no
shortage has developed, even though the monetary inducement to do-
nate is typically small. 146 A rational legislator thus might have con-
cluded that a ban on consideration for a sperm transfer was
unnecessary. It is possible that, in failing to classify genetic material
as organs, Congress had sperm in mind and simply did not consider
the fact that ova are less plentiful, more difficult to hand over, and
thus likely to attract higher compensation. NOTA was also enacted
143 See H.R. REP. No. 98-1127, at 16 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3989, 3992
(demonstrating that Congress did not intend NOTA to apply to replenishable tissues such as
sperm and blood).
144 See Dale D. Chitwood et al., The Donation and Sale of Blood by Intravenous Drug
Users, 81 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 631, 632 (1991). The practice of paying for blood ended due to
public health concerns. Id.
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(1) (2000).
146 See Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Financial Compensation of Oo-
cyte Donors, 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 305, 308 (2007) [hereinafter Financial Compensation of
Oocyte Donors].
1652 [Vol. 76:1623
Regulating Reproduction
before ova donation became commonplace. Indeed, the first IVF
birth-which did not rely on donated sperm or ova-occurred only six
years before NOTA's enactment. 147
To the extent that Congress did fail to extend the anticommodifi-
cation ban to genetic materials because of a sense that such action was
unnecessary, it is now clear that this perception was incorrect. Ova
donors are regularly paid $8,000 to $20,000 per donation, and there
are reports of $50,000 and $100,000 payments as well as a host of valu-
able noncash inducements. 148 To the extent that Congress was simply
shortsighted, it also seems significant that, in nations that have at-
tempted to think more comprehensively about transactions involving
the body, transfers of ova have typically been classified with transfers
of organs.149 Indeed, some countries, including our northern neighbor
Canada, have outlawed all commercial transactions involving repro-
ductive material and services.1 50
In sum, there seems to be every reason to classify ova sales with
organ sales. Both involve valuable, life-giving aspects of the body;
both involve scarce resources that can command extremely high, coer-
cive prices; and both offer the ability to buy life to those-and only
those-who can afford the price tag.
Not only do the policy goals that motivated NOTA seem fully
applicable to ova sale, but the values that underlie the longstanding
proscription on baby sale also support a ban on the sale of genetic
material. We outlaw baby sale because of the belief that human be-
ings should not be bought and sold. Thus, although traditional statu-
tory prohibitions on baby sale apply only when the baby is in utero or
after its birth, the first American court to consider a "surrogate"
parenting contract had no difficulty finding that the baby-selling ban
was applicable to the contract even though it was signed before the
pregnancy began.51 "It strains credulity," the court declared, "to
claim that these arrangements ... really amount to something other
147 BBC on This Day, 1978: First "Test Tube Baby" Born, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/
hildates/stories/uly/25/newsid-2499000/2499411.stm (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
148 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHIcs, REPROD. & RESP., THE REGULATION OF
NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 149 (2004) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS] (describ-
ing advertisements in college newspapers offering students $25,000 and $50,000 in exchange for
ova).
149 Cf sources cited supra note 14.
150 See Kristian Gravenor, Infertile Ground, MONTREAL MIRROR, Aug. 19-25, 2004, availa-
ble at http://www.montrealmirror.com/ARCHIVES/2004/081904/cover-news.html.
151 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1250 (N.J. 1988).
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than a private placement adoption for money. ' 152 Although genetic
material is a step away from a baby, the reason genetic material is
sought, valued, and purchased for high prices is because of its unique
potential to produce a child. And a system which forbids a woman
from pocketing any money in exchange for her child but permits her
to bank $50,000 for her ova-the very same ova that she would have
used to produce that child-certainly does not seem to rely on consis-
tent values.
The sale of genetic material also reinforces existing inequalities in
precisely the same way that baby sales do. Such a market prices "de-
sirable" traits-the right race, a high SAT score, athletic prowess, cer-
tain physical features or accomplishments-at much higher rates than
"undesirable" traits. For example,
Tiny Treasures, [a donor recruitment agency,] specializes in
Ivy League ovum donors. Its database includes photographs,
SAT scores, grade-point averages, and compensation re-
quests .... [Another agency's] website explains: "Asian and
Jewish ovum donors are always in demand. A tall, attractive
donor with a masters [sic] or doctorate degree will always
receive higher compensation than most other donors." Ivy
League donors from Tiny Treasures seek anywhere from
$8,000 to $20,000 compensation for a cycle of ova retrieval.153
Transactions like those brokered by Tiny Treasures produce "a two-
tiered system in which wealthy white ovum donors receive high pay-
ments . . whereas poor minority women receive substantially lower
payments .... ,,154 These same concerns also apply to at least some
sperm transfers; for example, sperm from a Nobel Prize-winner obvi-
ously sells for a much higher price than does sperm from an "ordi-
nary" donor.1 55
I do not mean to suggest that ova donors should receive no com-
pensation. Ova donation requires a substantial amount of time and
involves a certain amount of medical risk. It is thus appropriate to
compensate ova donors for the hours that the procedure has con-
sumed and to add a small payment, commensurate with those paid to
research volunteers, for the risks that they have undertaken. Based
152 Id. at 1241.
153 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 148, at 148-49.
154 Id. at 50 (internal citation omitted).
155 Cf. Jennifer Egan, Wanted: A Few Good Sperm, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19, 2006, at 44
("Buying sperm over the Internet ... is not much different from buying shoes.").
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on such a calculation, the ASRM has recommended payments to ova
donors of $3000 to $5000.156
We have absolutely no evidence, however, that the ASRM rec-
ommendation has had any effect on ova-donor payments. A quick
Web search reveals literally dozens of agencies engaged in donor re-
cruitment. Most fail to specify exactly how much money a donor will
receive, but many hint-as one site baldly specifies in bold print-that
donors are offered the "highest level of compensation.' 157 Although
some ova donors undoubtedly do receive compensation in line with
ASRM guidelines, ova-donation agencies are currently offering un-
negotiated compensation as high as $8000.158 Clearly, advisory guide-
lines are not stemming the tide of commercialism in ova transfers.
Thus, if we are serious about a noncommodification ethic in transac-
tions involving human beings and their body parts, we need binding
rules or standards.
A quasi-public agency like UNOS, charged with developing a na-
tional registry and developing donation criteria and standards, would
be an appropriate way to regulate ova-donor payments. Such an
agency could also play a useful role in establishing uniform guidelines
applicable to donor screening, donation limits, recordkeeping, and
confidentiality, all of which are now largely unregulated.
Conclusion
ART involves a wide range of legal and policy issues. Although
these issues are diverse, they are not unique to ART. ART presents
issues regarding the determination of legal parentage much like those
that arise in cases of sexual conception. ART presents issues of medi-
cal risk to adult participants much like those that arise in other medi-
cal practice settings. ART presents issues of medical risk to potential
beings and future children much like those that arise in obstetrical
practice. And transfers of genetic material used in ART present is-
156 See Financial Compensation of Oocyte Donors, supra note 146, at 308. The ASRM
calculation is based on average sperm-donation fees ($60 to $75 for one hour) multiplied by the
typical number of hours required for oocyte donation (fifty-six hours), or $3,360 to $4,200. Id.
Because payment in this value range does not fully account for the more onerous nature of
oocyte donation, ASRM concludes that "at this time sums of $5,000 or more require justification
and sums above $10,000 go beyond what is appropriate." Id.
157 The Egg Donor Program, Becoming an Egg Donor, http://www.eggdonation.com/
becoming-an-egg-donor/BecominganEggDonor.php (last visited July 1, 2008).
158 Reproductive Medicine Associates of New York, Egg Donation New York: Why Do-
nate, http://www.eggdonationny.com/why-donate.aspx (last visited July 1, 2008).
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sues very similar to those that arise in organ transfers and in baby
selling.
Regulatory policy for ART should thus rely on policies that un-
derlie related areas of law. Because we permit adult patients to un-
dergo risky experimental treatments, we should permit adult ART
patients to accept similar risks or adopt uniform rules that proscribe
the use of experimental treatments in both contexts. Because we al-
low would-be parents to abort fetuses with "undesirable" characteris-
tics, we should allow would-be parents who utilize ART to select out
unwanted potential beings with "undesirable" characteristics or adopt
rules that uniformly forbid some or all trait selection. Because we do
not allow parents to subject their children to serious medical risks, we
should not allow would-be parents using ART to subject their future
children to serious medical risks. And because we outlaw commer-
cialism in transfers of body parts and transfers of human beings, we
should outlaw commercialism in transfers of sperm and ova or uni-
formly permit commercialism.
Because ART involves complex, rapidly evolving medical proce-
dures, a quasi-public regulatory entity like that which the federal gov-
ernment has already established in the area of organ transplantation
thus appears to be the most promising regulatory structure and one
that fits well within the decentralized U.S. medical care system. Such
an entity would have the expertise to craft detailed, nuanced regula-
tory standards and to revise them rapidly in light of new evidence. It
would also have the capacity to encourage appropriate research and
to build a consensus within the ART community.
Whatever entity regulates ART should be charged with protect-
ing the interests of future children as its primary mission. This ap-
proach is consistent with all related areas of law and with the public
interest in ensuring that all children are protected from avoidable, se-
rious harm. Just as they are in other child-protection contexts, would-
be parents should be allowed to make decisions on behalf of future
children only if those decisions do not subject their children to serious
risks. Whatever entity regulates ART should also be charged with
protecting other recognized public values that apply in related areas
of law, including the equality of persons and the noncommodification
of body parts and human lives.
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